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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, non-governmental organizations have issued their own curren-
cies for a wide variety of purposes. These currencies, known as scrip, have
been used in company towns where government issued currency was scarce
[Timberlake 1987], in Washington DC to reduce the robbery rate of bus drivers
[Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission 1970], and in Ithaca (New York)
to promote fairer pay and improve the local economy [Ithaca Hours Inc. 2005]. Scrip
systems have also been proposed for a variety of online systems.
To give some examples, market-based solutions using scrip systems have been sug-
gested for applications such as system-resource allocation [Miller and Drexler 1988],
managing replication and query optimization in a distributed database
[Stonebraker et al. 1996], and allocating experimental time on a wireless sensor
network test bed [Chun et al. 2005]; a number of sophisticated scrip systems have
been proposed [Gupta et al. 2003; Ioannidis et al. 2002; Vishnumurthy et al. 2003] to
allow agents to pool resources while avoiding what is known as free riding, where
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agents take advantage of the resources the system provides while providing none
of their own (as Adar and Huberman [2000] have shown, this behavior certainly
takes place in systems such as Gnutella); and Yootles [Reeves et al. 2007] uses a
scrip system as a way of helping groups make decisions using economic mechanisms
without involving real money.
In this paper, we provide a formal model in which to analyze scrip systems. We
describe a simple scrip system and show that, under reasonable assumptions, for each
fixed amount of money there is a nontrivial equilibrium involving threshold strategies,1
where an agent accepts a request if he has less than $k for some threshold k. Although
we refer to our unit of scrip as the dollar, these are not real dollars, nor do we view
“scrip dollars” as convertible to real dollars. This is a crucial part of our model, as we
assume that scrip is only valued for its use in the system.
An interesting aspect of our analysis is that, in equilibrium, the distribution of users
with each amount of money is the distribution that minimizes relative entropy to an
appropriate distribution (subject to the money supply constraint). This allows us to use
techniques from statistical mechanics to explicitly compute the distribution of money
and thus agents’ best-reply functions. Using this analysis and results of Tarski [1955],
Topkis [1979], and Milgrom and Roberts [1990], we can show that there are pure-
strategy equilibria using threshold strategies, and that these can be found using a
simple algorithm.
In a companion paper [Kash et al. 2012], we use our analysis of this model to answer
questions of interest to system designers. For example, we examine how the quantity
of money effects the efficiency of the equilibrium and show that it is maximized by
maintaining the appropriate ratio between the total amount of money and the number
of agents. This ratio can be found by increasing the money supply up to the point
that the system experiences a “monetary crash,” where money is sufficiently devalued
that no agent is willing to perform a service. We also incorporate agents altruistically
providing service, hoarding money, creating multiple identities, and colluding into the
model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related work.
Then in Section 3, we present the formal model. We analyze the distribution of money
in this model when agents are using threshold strategies in Section 4, and show that
it is characterized by relative entropy. Using this analysis, we show in Section 5 that,
under minimal assumptions, there is a nontrivial equilibrium where all agents use
threshold strategies. These results apply to a sufficiently large population of agents
after a sufficiently long period of time, so in Section 6 we use simulations to demon-
strate that these values are reasonable in practice. We conclude in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Scrip systems have a long history in computer science, with two main thrusts: re-
source allocation and free-riding prevention. Early applications for resource alloca-
tion include allocating time on shared computers (e.g. the PDP-1 at Harvard Uni-
versity in the 1960s [Sutherland 1968]), agoric systems [Miller and Drexler 1988],
which envisioned solving problems such as processor scheduling using markets, and
Mariposa [Stonebraker et al. 1996], a market-driven query optimizer for distributed
databases. More recently, scrip systems have been used to allocate the resources of re-
search testbeds. Examples include Mirage [Chun et al. 2005] for wireless sensor net-
works, Bellagio [AuYoung et al. 2007] for PlanetLab, and Egg [Brunelle et al. 2006] for
grid computing. Virtual markets have been used to coordinate the activity of nodes of a
1We do not restrict agents to playing threshold strategies, but our results show it is near optimal for them
to do so when other agents do so as well.
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sensor network [Mainland et al. 2004]. Yootles [Reeves et al. 2007] uses a scrip to help
people make everyday decisions, such as where to have lunch, without involving real
money.
Systems that use scrip to prevent free riding include
KARMA [Vishnumurthy et al. 2003], which provides a general framework for
P2P networks. Gupta et al. [2003] propose what they call a “debit-credit rep-
utation computation” for P2P networks, which is essentially a scrip system.
Fileteller [Ioannidis et al. 2002] uses payments in a network file storage system.
Dandelion [Sirivianos et al. 2007] uses scrip in a content distribution setting. Be-
lenkiy et al. [2007] consider how a BitTorrent-like system can make use of e-cash.
Antfarm [Peterson and Sirer 2009] uses scrip to optimize content distribution across
a number of BitTorrent-like swarms.
Despite this tremendous interest in scrip systems, there has been relatively little
work studying how they behave. While there has been extensive work in macroeco-
nomics on the effect of variables such as the amount of money in circulation on the
economy (see, for example, the relevant chapters of [Blanchard and Fischer 1989]),
this work focuses on goals such as minimizing inflation and maximizing employment
that are not directly relevant to a system designer.
There is also a literature in economics that attempts to understand the properties
of government-backed currencies that are not tied to a commodity such as gold (fiat
money). An early model by Kiyotaki and Wright [1989] has some similarity with our
approach in terms of analysis technique, but focuses on money as useful because it can
be held for free, while there are costs associated with storing a physical good until it
can be traded for a different, desired good. A large literature has built on this model.
Green and Zhou [1998] relax Kiyotaki and Wright’s assumption that agents can only
hold a single unit of money. In subsequent work, Green and Zhou [2002] eliminate
storage costs in favor of perishable goods and introduce an analysis of the dynamics
of the system. Perhaps most closely related, Berentsen [2002] characterizes the equi-
librium distribution of money in a model with perishable goods. Although the model
is somewhat different, this characterization corresponds to a simple special case of
our characterization. Berentsen and Rocheteau [2002] examine the extent to which
inefficiency in this type of model depends on whether money is indivisible.
An important technical difference in these models from our work is that there
is assumed to be a continuum of agents. This means that the evolution of the
system is deterministic, and the distribution of money does not change in steady
state. In contrast, our approach assumes a large but finite population of agents,
and explicitly models the extent to which fluctuations in the distribution of money
occur. Furthermore, the analysis in this line of work relies on a symmetry in
agent preferences, while our model allows different types of agents with dis-
tinct preferences. Two other solution concepts have recently been investigated that
look at the behavior of systems with an infinite number of agents: mean field
equilibrium [Adlakha et al. 2010; Adlakha and Johari 2010] and oblivious equilib-
rium [Weintraub et al. 2008; Weintraub et al. 2010; Weintraub et al. 2011]. These so-
lution concepts are similar in spirit to ours, in that they find equilibria in restricted
sets of strategies, and then show that these converge to approximations of the true
equilibria. Our results are somewhat stronger; we show that the “restricted equilib-
rium” is an approximate equilibrium, rather than just converging to one. In fact, we
conjecture that our threshold equilibrium is precisely the mean field equilibrium for
our model.
Ng et al. [2005] studied user behavior in a deployed scrip system, and observed that
users behaved rationally in the presence of a non-strategyproof combinatorial auction.
Among other manipulations, they observed users breaking of a single bid into multiple
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bids to exploit the greedy nature of the clearing algorithm. Their observations suggest
that system designers will have to deal with game-theoretic concerns.
Hens et al. [2007] do a theoretical analysis of what can be viewed as a scrip system
in a related model. There are a number of significant differences between the mod-
els. First, in the Hens et al. model, there is essentially only one type of agent, but an
agent’s utility for getting service (our γt) may change over time. Thus, at any time,
there will be agents who differ in their utility. In our model, agents want service only
occasionally, so, at each round, we assume that one agent is chosen (by nature) to re-
quest a service, while other agents decide whether or not to provide it. (As the number
of agents increases, the time between rounds decreases, so as to keep this assumption
reasonable.) In the Hens et al. model, every agent always desires service, so, at each
round, each agent decides whether to provide service, request service, or opt out, as a
function of his utilities and the amount of money he has. They assume that there is
no (direct) cost for providing service and everyone is able to do so. However, they do
assume that agents cannot simultaneously provide and receive service, an assumption
that is typically unreasonable in a peer-to-peer system. Rather than having desire for
service arise from explicitly modeled fluctuations in utility, we model it as being exoge-
nously generated for one agent in each round. The decrease in time between rounds
captures the ability of agents to provide service at essentially the same time they re-
ceive it. Under this assumption, a system with optimal performance is one where half
the agents request service and the other half are willing to provide it. Despite these
differences, Hens et al. also show that agents will use a threshold strategy.
Aperjis and Johari [2006] examine a model of a P2P filesharing system as an ex-
change economy. They associate a price (in bandwidth) with each file and find a market
equilibrium in the resulting economy. Later work by Aperjis et al. does use a currency,
but the focus remains on establishing market prices [2008] Subsequent to our work,
Dandekar et al. [2011] examined networks where each agent can issue his own scrip,
Rahman et al. [2010] proposed a protocol to automatically adjust credit policies to
maintain stability, Humbert et al. [2011] modeled scrip systems where multiple agents
combine to provide service, van der Schaar et al. [2013] studied how to set parameters
in a way that is robust to noise, and Johnson et al. [2014] showed that welfare can be
improved if the system prefers volunteers with low amounts of scrip.
The ultimate goal of a scrip system is to promote cooperation. While there is lim-
ited theoretical work on scrip systems, there is a large body of work on coopera-
tion. Much of the work involves a large group of agents being randomly matched
to play a game such as prisoner’s dilemma. Such models were studied in the eco-
nomics literature [Kandori 1992; Ellison 1994] and first applied to online reputations
in [Friedman and Resnick 2001]; Feldman et al. [2004] apply them to P2P systems.
These models fail to capture important asymmetries in the interactions of the
agents. When a request is made, there are typically many people in the network who
can potentially satisfy it (especially in a large P2P network), but not all can. For ex-
ample, some people may not have the time or resources to satisfy the request. The
random-matching process ignores the fact that some people may not be able to satisfy
the request. (Presumably, if the person matched with the requester could not satisfy
the match, he would have to defect.) Moreover, it does not capture the fact that the
decision as to whether to “volunteer” to satisfy the request should be made before the
matching process, not after. That is, the matching process does not capture the fact
that if someone is unwilling to satisfy the request, there may well be others who can
satisfy it. Finally, the actions and payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game do not obvi-
ously correspond to actual choices that can be made. For example, it is not clear what
defection on the part of the requester means. Our model addresses all these issues.
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Scrip systems are not the only approach to preventing free riding. Two other ap-
proaches often used in P2P networks are barter and reputation systems. The essence
of barter for our purposes is that when deciding whether to provide service to others
agents only consider the value created by their own current or past interactions with
the agent in question. Perhaps the best-known example of a system that uses barter is
BitTorrent [Cohen 2003], where clients downloading a file try to find other clients with
parts they are missing so that they can trade, thus creating a roughly equal amount
of work. Since the barter is restricted to users currently interested in a single file, this
works well for popular files, but tends to have problems maintaining availability of
less popular ones. An example of a barter-like system built on top of a more traditional
file-sharing system is the credit system used by eMule [eMule Project 2009]. Each user
tracks his history of interactions with other users and gives priority to those he has
downloaded from in the past. However, in a large system, the probability that a pair
of randomly-chosen users will have interacted before is quite small, so this interac-
tion history will not be terribly helpful. Anagnostakis and Greenwald [2004] present
a more sophisticated version of this approach, but it still seems to suffer from similar
problems. More recently, Piatek et al. [2008] have proposed a model based on includ-
ing intermediaries a single hop away; this model is more liquid than barter but not as
liquid as a full scrip system.
A number of attempts have been made at providing general reputation systems
(e.g. [Guha et al. 2004; Gupta et al. 2003; Kamvar et al. 2003; Xiong and Liu 2002]).
The basic idea is to aggregate each user’s experience into a global number for each
individual that intuitively represents the system’s view of that individual’s reputa-
tion. However, these attempts tend to suffer from practical problems because they
implicitly view users as either “good” or “bad”, assume that the “good” users will act
according to the specified protocol, and that there are relatively few “bad” users. Un-
fortunately, if there are easy ways to game the system, once this information becomes
widely available, rational users are likely to make use of it. We cannot count on only
a few users being “bad” (in the sense of not following the prescribed protocol). For
example, Kazaa uses a measure of the ratio of the number of uploads to the num-
ber of downloads to identify good and bad users. However, to avoid penalizing new
users, they gave new users an average rating. Users discovered that they could use
this relatively good rating to free ride for a while and, once it started to get bad, they
could delete their stored information and effectively come back as a “new” user, thus
circumventing the system (see [Anagnostakis and Greenwald 2004] for a discussion
and [Friedman and Resnick 2001] for a formal analysis of this “whitewashing”). Thus,
Kazaa’s reputation system is ineffective.
3. THE MODEL
Before specifying our model formally, we give an intuitive description of what our
model captures. We model a scrip system where, as in a P2P filesharing system, agents
provide each other with service. There is a single service (such as file uploading) that
agents occasionally want. In practice, at any given time, a number of agents will want
service but, to simplify the formal description and analysis, we model the scrip sys-
tem as proceeding in a series of rounds where, in each round, a single agent wants
service (the time between rounds will be adjusted to capture the growth in parallelism
as the number of agents grows).2 In each round, after an agent requests service, other
agents have to decide whether they want to volunteer to provide service. However, not
2For large numbers of agents, our model converges to one in which agents make requests in real time, and
the time between an agent’s requests is exponentially distributed. In addition, the time between requests
served by a single player is also exponentially distributed.
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all agents may be able to satisfy the request (not everyone has every file). While, in
practice, the ability of agents to provide service at various times may be correlated
for a number of reasons (if I don’t have the file today I probably still don’t have it to-
morrow; if one agent does not have a file, it may be because it is rare, so that should
increase the probability that other agents do not have it), for simplicity, we assume
that the events of an agent being able to provide service in different rounds or two
agents being able to provide service in the same or different rounds are independent.
If there is at least one volunteer, someone is chosen from among the volunteers (at
random) to satisfy the request. Our model allows some agents to be more likely to be
chosen (perhaps they have more bandwidth) but does not capture rules that take the
amount of scrip volunteers have into account (such rules are considered by Johnson et
al. [2014]) or allow an agent to specify which agent is chosen. Allowing agents this type
of control would break the symmetries we use to characterize the long-run behavior of
the system, and would create new opportunities for strategic behavior. The requester
then gains some utility (he got the file) and the volunteer loses some utility (he had to
use his bandwidth to upload the file), and the requester pays the volunteer a fee that
we fix at one dollar. As is standard in the literature, we assume that agents discount
future payoffs. This captures the intuition that a reward today is worth more than a
reward tomorrow, and allows us to compute the total utility derived by an agent in
an infinite game. The amount of utility gained by having a service performed and the
amount lost by performing it, as well as many other parameters may depend on the
agent.
More formally, we assume that agents have a type t drawn from some finite set T of
types. We can describe the entire population of agents using the pair (T, ~f), where ~f
is a vector of length |T | and ft is the fraction with type t. In this paper, we consider
only what we call standard agents. These are agents who derive no pleasure from per-
forming a service, and for whom money is valued only for its use in obtaining service.
Thus, for a standard agent, there is no direct connection between money (measured
in dollars) and utility (measured in utils). We can characterize the type of a standard
agent by a tuple t = (αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt, χt), where
— αt > 0 is the undiscounted cost in utils for an agent of type t to satisfy a request;
— 0 < βt < 1 is the probability that an agent of type t can satisfy a request;
— γt > αt is the utility that an agent of type t gains for having a request satisfied;
— 0 < δt < 1 is the rate at which an agent of type t discounts utility;
— ρt > 0 represents the (relative) request rate (some people want files more often than
others). For example, if there are two types of agents with ρt1 = 2 and ρt2 = 1 then
agents of the first type will make requests twice as often as agents of the second
type. Since these request rates are relative, we can multiply them all by a constant
to normalize them. To simplify later notation, we assume the ρt are normalized so
that
∑
t∈T ρtft = 1;
— χt > 0 represents the (relative) likelihood of an agent to be chosen when he volunteers
(some uploaders may be more popular than others). In particular, this means the
relative probability of two given agents being chosen is independent of which other
agents volunteer; and
— ωt = βtχt/ρt is not part of the tuple, but is an important derived parameter that, as
we will see in Section 4, helps determine how much money an agent will have.
We occasionally omit the subscript t on some of these parameters when it is clear from
context or irrelevant.
Representing the population of agents in a system as (T, ~f) captures the essential
features of a scrip system we want to model: there are a large number of agents who
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may have different types. Note that some tuples (T, ~f)may be incompatible with there
being some number N of agents. For example, if there are two types, and ~f says that
half of the agents are of each type, then there cannot be 101 agents. Similar issues
arise when we want to talk about the amount of money in a system We could deal
with this problem in a number of ways (for example, by having each agent determine
his type at random according to the distribution ~f ). For convenience, we simply do not
consider population sizes that are incompatible with ~f . This is the approach used in
the literature on N -replica economies [Mas-Colell et al. 1995].
Formally, we consider games specified by a tuple (T, ~f , h,m, n), where T and ~f are
as defined above, h ∈ N is the base number of agents of each type, n ∈ N is number
of replicas of these agents and m ∈ R+ is the average amount of money. The total
number of agents is thus hn. We ensure that the fraction of agents of type t is exactly
ft and that the average amount of money is exactly m by requiring that fth ∈ N and
mh ∈ N. Having created a base population satisfying these constraints, we can make
an arbitrary number of copies of it. More precisely, we assume that agents 0 . . . ft1h− 1
have type t1, agents ft1h . . . (ft1 + ft2)h− 1 have type t2, and so on through agent h− 1.
These base agents determine the types of all other agents. Each agent j ∈ {h, . . . , hn−
1} has the same type as j mod h; that is, all the agents of the form j + kh for k =
1, . . . , n− 1 are replicas of agent j.
We also need to specify how money is initially allocated to agents. Our results are
based on the long-run behavior of the system and so they turn out to hold for any
initial allocation of money. For simplicity, at the start of the game we allocate each of
the hmn dollars in the system to an agent chosen uniformly at random, but all our
results would hold if we chose any other initial distribution of money.
To make precise our earlier informal description, we describe (T, ~f, h,m, n) as an
infinite extensive-form game. A non-root node in the game tree is associated with a
round number (how many requests have been made so far), a phase number, either
1, 2, 3 , or 4 (which describes how far along we are in determining the results of the
current request), a vector ~x where xi is the current amount of money agent i has, and∑
i xi = mhn, and, for some nodes, some additional information whose role will be
made clear below. We use τ(i) to denote the type of agent i.
—The game starts at a special root node, denoted Λ, where nature moves. Intuitively,
at Λ, nature allocates money uniformly at random, so it transitions to a node of the
form (0, 1, ~x): round zero, phase one, and allocation of money ~x, and each possible
transition is equally likely.
—At a node of the form (r, 1, ~x), nature selects an agent to make a request in the current
round. Agent i is chosen with probability ρτ(i)/hn. If i is chosen, a transition is made
to (r, 2, ~x, i).
—At a node of the form (r, 2, ~x, i), nature selects the set V of agents (not including i)
able to satisfy the request. Each agent j 6= i is included in V with probability βτ(j). If
V is chosen, a transition is made to (r, 3, ~x, i, V ).
—At a node of the form (r, 3, ~x, i, V ), each agent in V chooses whether to volunteer. If
V ′ is the set of agents who choose to volunteer, a transition is made to (r, 4, ~x, i, V ′).
—At a node of the form (r, 4, ~x, i, V ′), if V ′ 6= ∅, nature chooses a single agent in V ′ to
satisfy the request. Each agent j is chosen with probability χτ(j)/
∑
j′∈V ′ χτ(j′). If j is
chosen, a transition is made to (r + 1, 1, ~x′), where
x′j =
{
xj − 1 if i = j and xj > 0,
xj + 1 if j is chosen by nature and xi > 0,
xj otherwise.
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If V ′ = ∅, nature has no choice; a transition is made to (r+ 1, 1, ~x) with probability 1.
A strategy for agent ℓ describes whether or not he will volunteer at every node of
the form (r, 3, ~x, i, V ) such that ℓ ∈ V . (These are the only nodes where ℓ can move.)
We also need to specify what agents know when they make their decisions. To make
our results as strong as possible, we allow an agent to base his strategy on the entire
history of the game, which includes, for example, the current wealth of every other
agent. As we show, even with this unrealistic amount of information, available, it
would still be approximately optimal to adopt a simple strategy that requires little
information—specifically, agents need to know only their current wealth. That means
that our results would continue to hold as long as agents knew at least this infor-
mation. A strategy profile ~S consists of one strategy per agent. A strategy profile ~S
determines a probability distribution over paths Pr~S in the game tree. Each path de-
termines the value of the following random two variables:
— xri , the amount of money agent i has during round r, defined as the value of xi at the
nodes with round number r and
— uri , the utility of agent i for round r. If i is a standard agent, then
uri =


γτ(i) if a node (r, 4, ~x, i, V
′) is on the path with V ′ 6= 0
−ατ(i) if i is chosen by nature at node (r, 4, ~x, j, V
′)
0 otherwise.
Ui(~S), the total expected utility of agent i if strategy profile ~S is played, is the dis-
counted sum of his per round utilities uri , but the exact form of the discounting requires
some explanation. In our model, only one agent makes a request each round. As the
number of agents increases, an agent has to wait a larger number of rounds to make
requests, so naively discounting utility would mean his utility decreases as the num-
ber of agents increases, even if all of his requests are satisfied. This is an artifact of
our model breaking time into discrete rounds where a single agent makes a request.
In reality, many agents make requests in parallel, and how often an agent desires ser-
vice typically does not depend on the number of agents. It would be counterintuitive
to have a model that says that if agents make requests at a fixed rate and they are
all satisfied, then their expected utility depends on the number of other agents. As the
following lemma shows, there is a unique discount rate that removes this dependency.3
LEMMA 3.1. With a discount rate of (1 − (1 − δt)/n), an agent of type t’s expected
discounted utility for having all his requests satisfied is independent of the number of
replicas n. Furthermore, this is the unique such rate such that the discount rate is δt
when n = 1.
PROOF. The agent makes a request each round with probability ρt/hn, so his ex-
pected discounted utility for having all his requests satisfied is
∞∑
r=0
(1− (1 − δt)/n)
r(ρtγt/(hn)) = (ρtγt/(hn))/(1− (1 − (1− δt)/n))
= (ρtγt/h)/(1− δt)
3In preliminary versions of this work we used the discount rate of δ
1/n
t . This rate captures the intuitive idea
of making the time between rounds 1/n, but results in an agent’s utility depending on the number of other
agents, even if all the agent’s requests are satisfied. However, in the limit as δt goes to 1, agents’ normalized
expected utilities (multiplied by 1− δt, as in Equation 1) are the same with either discount rate, so our main
results hold with the discount rate δ
1/n
t as well.
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This is independent of n, and satisfies (1 − (1 − δt)/1) = δt, as desired. It is unique
because choosing any other discount rate for some n will cause the value of the sum to
differ from (ρtγt/h)/(1− δt) for that n.
As is standard in economics, for example in the folk theorem for repeated
games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991], we multiply an agent’s utility by (1 − δt) so that
his expected utility is independent of his discount rate as well. With these consider-
ations in mind, the total expected utility of agent i given the vector of strategies ~S
is
Ui(~S) = (1− δτ(i))
∞∑
r=0
(1− (1− δτ(i))/n)
rE~S [u
r
i ], (1)
In modeling the game this way, we have implicitly made a number of assumptions.
For example, we have assumed that all of agent i’s requests that are satisfied give
agent i the same utility, and that prices are fixed. We discuss the implications of these
assumptions in Section 7.
Our solution concept is the standard notion of an approximate Nash equilibrium. As
usual, given a strategy profile ~S and agent i, we use (S′i, ~S−i) to denote the strategy
profile that is identical to ~S except that agent i uses S′i.
Definition 3.2. A strategy S′i for agent i is an ǫ-best reply to a strategy profile ~S−i
for the agents other than i in the game (T, ~f , h,m, n) if, for all strategies S′′i ,
Ui(S
′′
i , ~S−i) ≤ Ui(S
′
i, ~S−i) + ǫ.
Definition 3.3. A strategy profile ~S for the game (T, ~f , h,m, n) is an ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium if for all agents i, Si is an ǫ-best reply to ~S−i. A Nash equilibrium is an epsilon-
Nash equilibrium with ǫ = 0.
As we show in Section 5, (T, ~f, h,m, n) has equilibria where agents use a particularly
simple type of strategy, called a threshold strategy. Intuitively, an agent with “too little”
money will want to work, to minimize the likelihood of running out due to making a
long sequence of requests before being able to earn more money. On the other hand,
a rational agent with plenty of money will think it is better to delay working, thanks
to discounting. These intuitions suggest that the agent should volunteer if and only
if he has less than a certain amount of money. Let sk be the strategy where an agent
volunteers if and only if the requester has at least 1 dollar and the agent has less
than k dollars. Note that s0 is the strategy where the agent never volunteers. While
everyone playing s0 is a Nash equilibrium (nobody can do better by volunteering if no
one else is willing to), it is an uninteresting one.
We frequently consider the situation where each agent of type t uses the same
threshold skt . In this case, a single vector ~k suffices to indicate the threshold of each
type, and we can associate with this vector the strategy ~S(~k) where ~S(~k)i = skτ(i) (i.e.,
agent i of type τ(i) uses threshold kτ(i)).
For the rest of this paper, we focus on threshold strategies (and show why it is rea-
sonable to do so). In particular, we show that, if all other agents use threshold strate-
gies, it is approximately optimal for an agent to use one as well. Furthermore there
exist Nash equilibria where agents do so.4 While there are potentially other equilibria
that use different strategies, if a system designer has agents use threshold strategies
4These equilibria actually satisfy the stronger condition of (approximate) subgame perfection.
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by default (e.g., through the standard behavior of the client software), no agent will
have an incentive to change. Since threshold strategies have such low information re-
quirements, they are a particularly attractive choice for a system designer as well for
the agents, since they are so easy to play.
For threshold strategy ~S(~k), if mhn ≥
∑
t ftkthn the system will quickly reach a
state where each agent has kt dollars, so no agent will volunteer. This is equivalent to
all agents using s0, and similarly uninteresting. Therefore, in our analysis we assume
that mhn <
∑
t ftkthn.
4. ANALYZING THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
Our main goal is to show that there exists an approximate equilibrium where all
agents play threshold strategies. In this section, we examine a more basic question:
if all agents play a threshold strategy, what happens? We show that there is some dis-
tribution over money (i.e., a distribution that describes what fraction of people have
each amount of money) such that the system “converges” to this distribution in a sense
to be made precise shortly.
To motivate our interest in the distribution, consider an agent i who is trying to
decide on a best response in a setting where all other agents are playing a threshold
strategy, and all agents of a particular type play the same strategy. Specifically, sup-
pose that agent i has $k, and is trying to decide whether to volunteer. Assume that
the system is sufficiently large that one agent’s decision does not affect the distribu-
tion. To figure out whether to volunteer, agent i must compute how likely he is to run
out of money before he gets a chance to make another dollar. Clearly this depends on
how much money he has. But it also depends on how likely he is to be chosen when
he volunteers, which, in turn, depends on how many other volunteers there are (and
thus on how many agents are not at their threshold). Our results show that there is
a distribution of money d∗ such that, with extremely high probability, the actual dis-
tribution is almost always extremely close to d∗. By knowing d∗, the agent will know
what fraction of agents of each type t have each amount of money. If all the agents of
type t use the same threshold strategy, he will also know how many agents of type t
volunteer. Moreover, this number will be essentially the same at every round. This will
enable him to figure out when he should volunteer.
We remark that, in addition to providing an understanding of system behavior that
underpins our later results, this result also provides a strong guarantee about the
stability of the economy. It shows that we do not have wild swings of behavior; in
particular, the fraction of agents volunteering is essentially constant.5
Suppose that all agents of each type t use the same threshold kt, so we can write the
vector of thresholds as ~k. For simplicity, assume that each agent has at most kt dollars.
We can make this assumption with essentially no loss of generality, since if someone
has more than kt dollars, he will just spend money until he has at most kt dollars. After
this point he will never acquire more than kt. Thus, eventually the system will be in a
state where, for all types t, no agent of type t has more than kt dollars.
We are interested in the vectors ~xr that can be observed in round r (recall that xri is
the amount of money that agent i has at round r). By assumption, if agent i has type
5Our results show that such swings occur with extremely small probability. While this guarantees they will
eventually occur, the expected time this takes is so large that it will effectively never happen in practice for
even a moderately sized system. Even if such an unlikely event did occur, our results guarantee that it is
transient and that the system will converge back toward the steady-state distribution.
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τ(i), then xri ∈ {0, . . . , kτ(i)}. In addition, since the total amount of money is hmn,
~xr ∈ X
T,~f,h,m,n,~k
= {~x ∈ Nhn | ∀i.xi ≤ kτi,
∑
i
xi = hmn}.
The evolution of ~xr can be described by a Markov chain M
T,~f,h,m,n,~k
over the state
space X
T,~f,h,m,n,~k
. For brevity, we refer to the Markov chain and state space as M
and X , respectively, when the subscripts are clear from context. It is possible to move
from state s to state s′ in a single round if, by choosing a particular agent i to make
a request and another agent j to satisfy it, i’s amount of money in s′ is 1 more than
in s; j’s amount of money in s′ is 1 less than in s’, and all other agents have the same
amount of money in s and s′. Therefore, the probability of a transition from a state
~x to ~y is 0 unless there exist two agents i and j such that ~yi′ = ~xi′ for all i′ /∈ {i, j},
~yi = ~xi + 1, and ~yj = ~xj − 1. In this case, the probability of transitioning from ~x to ~y
is the probability of j being chosen to make a request and i being chosen to satisfy it.
Let ∆~f,m,~k denote the set of probability distributions d on ∪t∈T {t}×
∏
t{0, . . . , kt} such
that for all types t,
∑kt
l=0 d(t, l) = ft and
∑
t
∑kt
l=0 ld(t, l) = m. We can think of d(t, l) as
the fraction of agents that are of type t and have l dollars. We can associate each state
~x with its corresponding distribution d~x. This is a useful way of looking at the system,
since we typically just care about the fraction of people with each amount of money,
not the amount that each particular agent has. We show that, if n is large, then there
is a distribution d∗ ∈ ∆~f,m,~k such that, after a sufficient amount of time, the Markov
chain M is almost always in a state ~x such that d~x is close to d∗. Thus, agents can
base their decisions about what strategy to use on the assumption that they will be
in a state where the distribution of money is essentially d∗. Note that, since agents
discount future utility, the transient behavior of the Markov chain does matter, but by
making δt sufficiently large (i.e., if agents are sufficiently patient) the effect on utility
can be made arbitrarily small. Similarly, for sufficiently large n, the effect on utility
due to extremely rare deviations from d∗ becomes arbitrarily small.
We can in fact completely characterize the distribution d∗. Given two distributions
d, q ∈ ∆~f,m,~k, let
H(d||q) =
∑
(t,j)s.t.q(t,j) 6=0
d(t, j) log
(
d(t, j)
q(t, j)
)
denote the relative entropy of d relative to q (H(d||q) = ∞ if d(t, j) = 0 and q(t, j) 6=
0 or vice versa); this is also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence of q from
d [Cover and Thomas 1991]. If ∆ is a closed convex set of distributions, then it is well
known that, for each q, there is a unique distribution in ∆ that minimizes the relative
entropy to q. Since ∆~f,m,~k is easily seen to be a closed convex set of distributions, in
particular, this is the case for ∆~f,m,~k. We now show that there exists a q such that, for
n sufficiently large, the Markov chain M is almost always in a state ~x such that d~x is
close to the distribution d∗
q, ~f,m
∈ ∆~f,m,~k that minimizes entropy relative to q. (We omit
some or all of the subscripts on d∗ when they are not relevant.) The statement is cor-
rect under a number of senses of “close”. For definiteness, we consider the Euclidean
distance. Given ε > 0 and q, let X
T,~f,h,m,n,~k,ε,q
(or Xε,q, for brevity) denote the set of
states ~x ∈ X
T,~f,h,m,n,~k
such that
∑
(t,j) |d
~x(t, j)− d∗q |
2 < ε.
Let Irq,n,ε be the random variable that is 1 if d
~xr ∈ Xε,q, and 0 otherwise.
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THEOREM 4.1. For all games (T, ~f, h,m, 1), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all ε > 0,
there exist q ∈ ∆~f,m,~k and nε such that, for all n > nε, there exists a round r
∗ such that,
for all r > r∗, we have Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1− ε.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in Appendix A. One interesting special case
of the theorem is when there exist β, χ, and ρ such that for all types t, βt = β, χt = χ,
and ρt = ρ. In this case q is the distribution q(t, j) = ft/(kt+1) (i.e., q is uniform within
each type t). We sketch the proof for this special case here.
PROOF. (Sketch) Using standard techniques, we can show that our Markov Chain
has a limit distribution π such that for all ~y, limr→∞ Pr(~x
r = ~y) = π(~y). Let T~x~y de-
note the probability of transitioning from (recurrent) state ~x to (recurrent) state ~y.
It is easily verified by an explicit computation of the transition probabilities that (in
this special case) T~x~y = T~y~x It is well known that this symmetry implies that π is
the uniform distribution [Resnick 1992]. Thus, after a sufficient amount of time, the
distribution of ~xr will be arbitrarily close to uniform.
Since, for large r, Pr(~xr = ~y) is approximately 1 / |X |, the probability of ~xr being
in a set of states is the size of the set divided by the total number of states. Using a
straightforward combinatorial argument, it can be shown that the fraction of states
not in Xε,q is bounded by p(n)/ecn, where p is a polynomial. This fraction goes to 0 as
n gets large. Thus, for sufficiently large n, Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1− ε.
The last portion of the proof sketch is actually a standard technique from statistical
mechanics that involves showing that there is a concentration phenomenon around
the maximum entropy distribution [Jaynes 1978]. To illustrate what we mean by a
concentration phenomenon, consider a system with only two dollars. With n agents,
there are O(n2) ways to assign the dollars to different agents and O(n) ways to assign
them to the same agent. If each way of assigning the two dollars to agents is equally
likely, we are far more likely to see a distribution of money where two agents have
one dollar each than one where a single agent has two dollars. In the special case
considered in the proof sketch, when π is the uniform distribution, the number of states
corresponding to a particular distribution d is proportional to enH(d) (where H here is
the standard entropy function). In general, each state is not equally likely, which is
why the general proof in Appendix A uses relative entropy.6
Theorem 4.1 tells us that, after enough time, the distribution of money is almost al-
ways close to some d∗, where d∗ can be characterized as a distribution that minimizes
relative entropy subject to some constraints. In Appendix A, we show that the appro-
priate distribution q is q(t, i) = (ωt)i/(
∑
t
∑kt
j=0(ωt)
j). The following lemma shows how
we can compute d∗ from q.
LEMMA 4.2.
d∗(t, i) =
ftλ
iq(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
jq(t, j)
, (2)
where λ is the unique value such that∑
t
∑
i
id∗(t, i) = m. (3)
The proof of Lemma 4.2 is omitted because it can be easily checked using Lagrange
multipliers in the manner of [Jaynes 1978] where the function to be minimized is the
6 Note that in generalizing to relative entropy we switch from maximizing to minimizing; maximizing en-
tropy is equivalent to minimizing relative entropy relative to the uniform distribution.
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relative entropy of d∗ relative to q and the constraints are that an ft fraction of the
agents are of type t and the average amount of money is m.
To give some intuition for the form of d∗, suppose that there is only a single agent
who randomly receives opportunities to earn and spend money, but receives opportu-
nities to earn ωt times as often as opportunities to spend, is unwilling to earn more
than kt dollars, and is unable to spend when he has zero dollars. Up to a normalizing
constant, his steady state probability of having i dollars is q(t, i). In the full system,
each agent is not walking independently, but instead is limited by the common amount
of money. This acts as a common bias on their walks, a factor which is captured by λ.
5. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA
We have seen that the system is well behaved if the agents all follow a threshold
strategy; we now want to show that, if the discount factor δ is sufficiently large for
all agents, there is a nontrivial approximate Nash equilibrium where they do so (that
is, an approximate Nash equilibrium where all the agents use sk for some k > 0.) To
understand why we need δ to be sufficiently large, note that if δ is small, then agents
have no incentive to work. Intuitively, if future utility is sufficiently discounted, then
all that matters is the present, and there is no point in volunteering to work. Thus,
for sufficiently small δ, s0 is the only equilibrium. To show that there is a nontriv-
ial equilibrium if the discount factor is sufficiently large, we first show that, if every
other agent is playing a threshold strategy, then there is an approximate best reply
that is also a threshold strategy. Furthermore, we show that the best-reply function is
monotone; that is, if some agents change their strategy to one with a higher thresh-
old, no other agent can do better by lowering his threshold. This makes our game one
with what Milgrom and Roberts [1990] call strategic complementarities. Using results
of Tarski [1955], Topkis [1979] showed that there are pure strategy equilibria in such
games, since the process of starting with a strategy profile where everyone always vol-
unteers (i.e., the threshold is∞) and then iteratively computing the best-reply profile
to it converges to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This procedure also provides
an efficient algorithm for explicitly computing equilibria.
To see that threshold strategies are approximately optimal, consider a single agent
i of type t and fix the vector ~k of thresholds used by the other agents. If we assume
that the number of agents is large, what an agent i does has essentially no effect on
the behavior of the system (although it will, of course, affect that agent’s payoffs). In
particular, this means that the distribution q of Theorem 4.1 characterizes the dis-
tribution of money in the system with high probability. (This applies only after some
period of time, but for patient agents the importance of this initial period is negligible.)
This distribution, together with the vector ~k of thresholds, determines what fraction of
agents volunteers at each step. This, in turn, means that from the perspective of agent
i, the problem of finding an optimal response to the strategies of the other agents re-
duces to finding an optimal policy in a Markov decision process (MDP) P
G,~S(~k),t. The
behavior of the MDP P
G,~S(~k),t depends on two probabilities: pu and pd. Informally, pu is
the probability of i earning a dollar during each round if is willing to volunteer, and pd
is the probability that i will be chosen to make a request during each round. Note that
pu depends onm, ~k, and t (although it turns out that pd depends only on n, the number
of agents in the system); if the dependence of pu on m, ~k, and/or t is important, we
add the relevant parameters to the superscript, writing, for example, pm,
~k
u . We show
that the optimal policy for i in P
G,~S(~k),t is a threshold policy, and that this policy is an
ε-optimal strategy for G. Importantly, the same policy is optimal independent of the
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value of n (as long as n is sufficiently large). This allows us to ignore the exact size of
the system in our later analysis.
For our results, it will be important to understand how pu, pd, and t affect the optimal
policy for P
G,~S(~k),t, and thus the ε-optimal strategies in the game. We use this under-
standing in this section to show that there exist nontrivial equilibria in Lemma 5.4
and for a number of results in our companion paper [Kash et al. 2012].
In the following lemma, whose proof (and the relevant formal definitions) are de-
ferred to Appendix B, Equation (4), quantifies the effects of these parameters. When
choosing whether he should volunteer with his current amount of money, an agent
faces a choice of whether to pay a utility cost of αt now in exchange for a discounted
payoff of γt when he eventually spends the resulting dollar. His choice will depend on
how much time he expects to pass before he spends that dollar (captured by the ran-
dom variable J in equation 4), which in turn depends on his current amount of money
k and the probabilities pu and pd. The following lemma quantifies this calculation.
LEMMA 5.1. Consider the gamesGn = (T, ~f, h,m, n) (where T , ~f , h, andm are fixed,
but nmay vary). There exists a k such that for all n, sk is an optimal policy for PGn,~S(~k),t.
The threshold k is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(κ,pu,pd)]γt, (4)
where J(κ, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value is the first round in which an agent
starting with κ dollars, using strategy sκ, and with probabilities pu and pd of earning a
dollar and of being chosen given that he volunteers, respectively, runs out of money.
Note that the uniqueness of the optimal value of k holds generically. In particular, it
holds unless (4) is satisfied with equality.
The following theorem shows that an optimal threshold policy for P
G,~S(~k),t is an
ε-optimal strategy for G. In particular, this means that Equation (4) allows us to un-
derstand how changing parameters affect an ε-optimal strategy for G, not just for
P
G,~S(~k),t.
THEOREM 5.2. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, n), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all
ε > 0, there exist n∗ε and δ
∗
ε,n such that for all n > n
∗
ε, types t ∈ T , and δt > δ
∗
ε,n, an
optimal threshold policy for P
G,~S(~k),t is an ε-best reply to the strategy profile
~S(~k)−i for
every agent i of type t.
We defer the proof of Theorem 5.2 to Appendix B. While, in this and later theorems,
the acceptable values of δ∗ε,n depend on n, they are independent if, as we suggest in
Section 6, the Markov Chain from Section 4 is rapidly mixing.
Given a game G = (T, ~f, h,m, n) and a vector ~k of thresholds, Lemma 5.1 gives an
optimal threshold k′t for each type t. Theorem 5.2 guarantees that sk′t is an ε-best reply
to ~S−i(~k), but does not rule out the possibility of other best replies. However, for ease
of exposition, we will call k′t the best reply to ~S−i and call BRG(~k) = ~k
′ the best-reply
function. The following lemma shows that this function is monotone (non-decreasing).
Along the way, we prove that several other quantities are monotone. First, we show
that λ
m,~k
, the value of λ from Lemma 4.2 given m and ~k, is non-decreasing in m and
non-increasing in ~k. We use this to show that pm,
~k
u is non-increasing in
~k, which is
needed to show the monotonicity of BRG. We defer the proof to Appendix B.
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LEMMA 5.3. Consider the family of games Gm = (T, ~f, h,m, n) and the strategies
~S(~k), for mhn <
∑
t ftkthn. For this family of games, λm,~k is non-decreasing in m and
non-increasing in ~k; pm,
~k
u is non-decreasing inm and non-increasing in
~k; and the func-
tion BRG is non-decreasing in ~k and non-increasing in m.
The intuition behind monotonicity is easy to explain: if the agents other than agent i
use a higher threshold, then they will volunteer more often. Thus, agent i is less likely
to be chosen when he volunteers, and thus he will need to volunteer more often (and so
use a higher threshold himself). Monotonicity is enough to guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium. We actually know that there is an equilibrium even without the use of
monotonicity. If all agents choose a threshold of $0, so no agent ever volunteers, then
clearly i’s best response is also never to volunteer; getting a dollar is useless if it can
never be spent. Fortunately, we can use monotonicity to show that there is a nontrivial
equilibrium in threshold strategies as well. Indeed, to guarantee the existence of a
nontrivial equilibrium, it suffices to show there is some vector ~k of thresholds such
that BRG(~k) > ~k.7 The following lemma, whose proof is again deferred to Appendix B,
shows that we can always find such a point for sufficiently large δt.
LEMMA 5.4. For all games G = (T, ~f, h,m, n), there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that if
δt > δ
∗ for all t, there is a vector ~k of thresholds such that BRG(~k) > ~k.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem: there exists a non-trivial equilibrium
where all agents play threshold strategies greater than zero.
THEOREM 5.5. For all games G = (T, ~f, h,m, 1) and all ǫ, there exist n∗ǫ and δ
∗
ǫ,n
such that, if n > n∗ǫ and δt > δ
∗
ǫ,n for all t, then there exists a nontrivial vector
~k of
thresholds that is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there exists a greatest such vector
(i.e. an equilibriumwhere the threshold used by each type is weakly higher than in every
other equilibrium).
PROOF. By Lemma 5.3, BRG is a non-decreasing function on a complete lattice, so
Tarski’s fixed point theorem [Tarski 1955] guarantees the existence of a greatest and
least fixed point; these fixed points are equilibria. The least fixed point is the trivial
equilibrium. We can compute the greatest fixed point by starting with the strategy
profile (∞, . . . ,∞) (where each agent uses the strategy S∞ of always volunteering)
and considering ǫ-best-reply dynamics, that is, iteratively computing the ǫ-best-reply
strategy profile. Monotonicity guarantees this process converges to the greatest fixed
point, which is an equilibrium (and is bound to be an equilibrium in pure strategies,
since the best reply is always a pure strategy). Since there is a finite amount of money,
this process needs to be repeated only a finite number of times. By Lemma 5.4, there
exists a ~k such that BRG(~k) > ~k. Monotonicity then guarantees that BRG(BRG(~k)) ≥
BRG(~k) and similarly for any number of applications of BRG. If ~k∗ is the greatest fixed
point of BRG, then ~k∗ > ~k. Thus, the greatest fixed point is a nontrivial equilibrium.
The use of Tarski’s fixed point theorem in the proof of Theorem 5.5 also provides an
algorithm for finding equilibria that seems efficient in practice: start with the strategy
profile (∞, . . . ,∞) and iterate the best-reply dynamics until an equilibrium is reached.
There is a subtlety in our results. In general, there may be many equilibria. From
the perspective of social welfare, some will be better than others. As we show in our
7We write ~k′ ≥ ~k to denote k′t ≥ kt for all t, with strictness if the inequality for at least one t is strict.
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Fig. 1. A hypothetical best-reply function with one type of agent.
companion paper, strategies that use smaller (but nonzero) thresholds increase social
welfare (intuitively, when agents are less willing to accumulate money, there are fewer
agents with zero dollars and so fewer missed opportunities). Consider the best-reply
function shown in Figure 1. In the game G in the example, there is only one type of
agent, so BRG : N → N. In equilibrium, we must have BR(k) = k; that is, an equilib-
rium is characterized by a point on the line y = x. This example has three equilibria,
where all agents play s0, s5, and s10 respectively. The strategy profile where all agents
play s5 is the equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, while s10 is the greatest equi-
librium.
In our companion paper, we focus on the greatest equilibrium in all our applications
(although a number of our results hold for all nontrivial equilibria). This equilibrium
has several desirable properties. First, it is guaranteed to be stable; best-reply dynam-
ics from nearby points converge to it. By way of contrast, best-reply dynamics moves
the system away from the equilibrium S5 in Figure 1. Unstable equilibria are difficult
to find in practice, and seem unlikely to be maintained for any length of time. Second,
the “greatest” equilibrium is the one found by the natural algorithm given in Theo-
rem 5.5. The proof of the theorem shows that it is also the outcome that will occur
if agents adopt the reasonable initial strategy of starting with a large threshold and
then using best-reply dynamics. Finally, by focusing on the worst nontrivial equilib-
rium, our results provide guarantees on social welfare, in the same way that results
on price of anarchy [Roughgarden and Tardos 2002] provide guarantees (since price
of anarchy considers the social welfare of the Nash equilibrium with the worst social
welfare).
6. SIMULATIONS
Theorem 4.1 proves that, for a sufficiently large number n of agents, and after a suffi-
ciently large number r of rounds, the distribution of wealth will almost always be close
to the distribution that minimizes relative entropy. In this section, we simulate the
game to gain an understanding of how large n and r need to be in practice. The sim-
ulations show that our theoretical results apply even to relatively small systems; we
get tight convergence with a few thousand agents, and weaker convergence for smaller
numbers, in very few rounds rounds, indeed, a constant number per agent.
The first simulation explores the tightness of convergence to the distribution that
minimizes relative entropy for various values of n. We used a single type of agent,
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Fig. 2. Maximum Euclidean distance from minimum relative entropy distribution d∗ over 106 timesteps.
with β = ρ = χ = 1, m = 2, and k = 5. For each value of n, the simulation was started
with a distribution of money as close as possible to the distribution d∗. (Recall that
d∗ is the distribution that minimizes relative entropy to the distribution q defined in
Theorem 4.1, and that d∗ characterizes the distribution of money in equilibrium when
the threshold strategy 5 is used.)
We then computed the maximum Euclidean distance between d∗ and the observed
distribution over 106 rounds. As Figure 2 shows, the system does not move far from d∗
once it is there. For example, if n = 5000, the system is never more than distance .001
from d∗. If n = 25, 000, it is never more than .0002 from d∗.
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Fig. 3. Distance from minimum relative entropy distribution with 1000 agents.
Figure 2 does show a larger distance for n = 1000, although in absolute terms it is
still small. The next simulation shows that, while the system may occasionally move
away from d∗, it quickly converges back to it. We averaged 10 runs of the Markov
chain, starting from an extreme distribution (every agent has either $0 or $5), and
considered the average time needed to come within various distances of d∗. As Figure 3
shows, after 2 rounds per agent, on average, the Euclidean distance from the average
distribution of money to d∗ is .008; after 3 rounds per agent, the distance is down to
.001.
Finally, we considered more carefully how quickly the system converges to d∗ for
various values of n. There are approximately kn possible states, so the convergence
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Fig. 4. Average time to get within .001 of the minimum relative entropy distribution.
time could in principle be quite large. However, we suspect that the Markov chain that
arises here is rapidly mixing, which means that it will converge significantly faster
(see [Lovasz and Winkler 1995] for more details about rapid mixing). We believe that
the actually time needed is O(n). This behavior is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows
that for our example chain (again averaged over 10 runs), after approximately 3n steps,
the Euclidean distance between the actual distribution of money in the system and d∗
is less than .001. This suggests that we should expect the system to converge in a
constant number of rounds per agent.
Note that this analysis assumes that agents follow the same strategy even when the
system has a distribution of money far from d∗. If agents are aware that the system is
in such a state and can find a better strategy, then convergence would not necessarily
be so rapid. However, we would never expect to observe such a deviation in practice in
even a moderately large system, and therefore these results help give confidence that
the deviations we would expect to see (for which the equilibrium strategies will still
be approximately optimal) will be short-lived. Even if such a large deviation were to
somehow occur (e.g., if a bug led to unusual behavior) this rapid convergence means
that the loss due to suboptimal play during that time would be small. As there is
not an obvious profitable deviation, it seems reasonable to believe that players would
continue to follow equilibrium behavior.
7. DISCUSSION
We have given a formal analysis of a scrip system and have shown that approximate
equilibria exist in threshold strategies and that the distribution of money in these
equilibria is given by relative entropy. As part of our equilibrium argument, we have
shown that the best-reply function is monotone. This proves the existence of equilibria
in pure strategies and permits efficient algorithms to compute these equilibria.
Our model makes a number of assumptions that are worthy of further discussion.
Some of the simplifying assumptions can be relaxed without significant changes to our
results (albeit at the cost of greater strategic and analytic complexity). At a high level,
our results show the system converges to a steady state when agents follow simple
threshold strategies and that there is in fact an equilibrium in these strategies. If, for
example, rather than all requests having the same value to agent (γt), the value of a
request is stochastic, agents might wish to have thresholds for each type of request.
This would allow an agent to forgo a low-valued request if he is low on money. This
makes the space of agent strategies larger and significantly complicates the proofs in
the appendix, but this high-level characterization still holds.
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The most significant assumption we make is that prices are fixed. However, our
results provide insight even if we relax this assumption. With variable prices, the
behavior of the system depends on the value of β, the probability that an agent can
satisfy a request. For large β, where are a large number of agents who can satisfy each
request, we expect the resulting competition to effectively produce a fixed price, so our
analysis applies directly. For small β, where there are few volunteers for each request,
variable prices can have a significant impact.
However, allowing prices to be set endogenously, by bidding, has a number of neg-
ative consequences. For one thing, it removes the ability of the system designer to
optimize the system using monetary policy. In addition, for small β, it is possible for
colluding agents to form a cartel to fix prices on a resource they control. It also greatly
increases the strategic complexity of using the system: rather than choosing a single
threshold, agents need an entire pricing scheme. Finally, the search costs and costs of
executing a transaction are likely to be higher with floating prices. Thus, we believe
that adopting a fixed price or a small set of fixed prices is often a reasonable design
decision.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Given a Markov chainM over a state space X and state s ∈ S, let Ir~x,~y be the random
variable that is 1 if M is in state ~y at time r and the chain started in state ~x and 0
otherwise. Then limr→∞ Pr(I
r
~x,~y = 1) is the limit probability of being in state ~y given
that the Markov chain starts in state ~x. In general, this limit does not exist. However,
there are well-known conditions under which the limit exists, and is independent of
the initial state ~x. A Markov chain is said to be irreducible if every state is reachable
from every other state; it is aperiodic if, for every state ~x, there exist two cycles from ~x
to itself such that the gcd of their lengths is 1.
THEOREM A.1. [Resnick 1992] If M is a finite, irreducible, and aperiodic Markov
chain over state space X , then there exists a d : X → R such that, for all ~x and ~y ∈ X ,
limr→∞ Pr(I
r
~x,~y = 1) = d(~y).
Thus, if we can show thatM is finite, irreducible, and aperiodic, then the limit dis-
tribution exists and is independent of the start state ~x. This is shown in the following
lemma.
LEMMA A.2. If there are at least three agents, then M is finite, irreducible, and
aperiodic and therefore has a limit distribution π.
PROOF. M is clearly finite since X is finite. We prove that it is irreducible by show-
ing that state ~y is reachable from state ~x by induction on the distance w =
∑n
i=1 |xi−yi|
(i.e., the sum of the absolute differences in the amount of money each person has in
states ~x and ~y). If w = 0, then ~x = ~y so we are done. Suppose that w > 0 and all pairs
of states that are less that w apart are reachable from each other. Consider a pair of
states ~x and ~y such that the distance from ~x to ~y is w. Since w > 0 and the total amount
of money is the same in all states, there must exist i1 and i2 such that xi1 > yi1 and
xi2 < yi2 . Thus, in state ~y, i1 is willing to work (since he has strictly less than the
threshold amount of money) and i2 has money to pay him (since i2 has a strictly posi-
tive amount of money). The state ~z that results from i1 doing work for i2 in state ~y is
of distance w − 2 from ~x. By the induction hypothesis, ~z is reachable from ~x. Since ~y is
clearly reachable from ~z, ~y is reachable from ~x.
Finally, we must show thatM is aperiodic. Suppose ~x is a state such that there exist
three agents i1, i2, and i3 where i1 has more than 0 dollars and i2 and i3 have less than
their threshold amount of money. There must be such a state by our assumption that
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mhn <
∑
t ftkthn. Clearly there is a cycle of length 2 from ~x to itself: i2 does work for
i1 and then i2 does work for i1. There is also a cycle of length 3: i2 does work for i1, i3
does work for i2, then i1 does work for i3. By irreducibility, identifying a single state
with this property is sufficient.
We next give an explicit formula for the limit distribution. Recall that in the special
case discussed in the main text, βt, χt, and ρt were the same for all types, so the
transition probabilities were symmetric and the limit distribution was uniform. While
with more general values they are no longer symmetric, they still have significant
structure that allows us to give a concise description of the limit distribution.
LEMMA A.3. For all states ~x of M, let w~x =
∏
i(βτ(i)χτ(i)/ρτ(i))
xi , and let Z =∑
~y w~y . Then the limit distribution ofM is π(~x) = w~x/Z.
PROOF. Define π by taking π(~x) = w~x/Z, where w~x and Z are as in the state-
ment of the lemma. If T~x~y is the probability of transitioning from state ~x to state ~y,
it is well known that it suffices to show that π satisfies the detailed balance condi-
tion [Resnick 1992], i.e., π(~x)T~x~y = π(~y)T~y~x for all states ~x and ~y and π is a probability
measure. The fact that π is a probability measure is immediate from its definition. To
check the first condition, let ~x and ~y be adjacent states such that ~y is reached from ~x by
i spending a dollar and j earning a dollar. This means that for the transition from ~x to
~y to happen, i must be chosen to spend a dollar and j must be able to work and chosen
to earn the dollar. Similarly for the reverse transition to happen, j must be chosen
to spend a dollar and i must be able to work and chosen to earn the dollar. All other
agents have the same amount of money in each state, and so will make the same deci-
sion in each state. Thus the probabilities associated with each transition differ only in
the relative likelihoods of i and j being chosen at each point. These may differ for three
reasons: one might be more likely to be able to satisfy requests (β), to want to make
requests (ρ), or to be chosen to satisfy requests (χ). Thus, for some p, which captures
the effect of other agents volunteering on the likelihood of i and j being chosen, we can
write the transition probabilities as T~x~y = ρτ(i)βτ(j)χτ(j)p and T~y~x = ρτ(j)βτ(i)χτ(i)p.
From the definition of π, we have that
π(~x)
π(~y)
=
βτ(i)χτ(i)ρτ(j)
ρτ(i)βτ(j)χτ(j)
=
T~y~x
T~x~y
.
Thus, π(~x)T~x~y = π(~y)T~y~x, as desired.
Note that for the special case considered in the main text, Lemma A.3 shows that
the limit distribution is the uniform distribution.
The limit distribution tells us the long run probability of being in a given state.
Theorem 4.1 does not mention states directly, but rather the distributions of money
associated with a state. In order to prove the theorem, we need to know the probability
of being in some state associated with a given distribution. This is established in the
following lemma.
LEMMA A.4. Let π be the limit distribution from Lemma A.3, and let V (d) =
H(d) − H(~f) − logZ +
∑
t
∑kt
i=0 id(t, i) logωt (where H is the standard entropy func-
tion; that is, H(d) =
∑
t,i d(t, i) log d(t, i)). For all d ∈ ∆~f,m,~k, either π({~x | d
~x = d}) = 0
or F (hn)ehnV (d) ≤ π({~x | d~x = d}) ≤ G(hn)ehnV (d), where F and G are polynomials.
PROOF. Before computing the probability of being in such a state, we first compute
the number of states. It is possible that there is no state ~x such that d = d~x (e.g., if hn is
odd and d has half the agents with 0 dollars). If there is such a state ~x, each such state
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has hnd(t, i) agents of type t with i dollars. Thus, the number of states ~x with d = d~x
is the number of ways to divide the agents into groups of these sizes. Since there are
hnft agents of type t, the number of such states is∏
t
(
hnft
hnd(t, 0), . . . , hnd(t, kt)
)
.
To complete the proof, we use the fact (shown in the proof of Lemma 3.11 of
[Grove et al. 1994]) that
1
F (hn)
ehnftH(dt) ≤
(
hnft
hnd(t, 0), . . . , hnd(t, kt)
)
≤ G(hn)ehnftH(dt),
where F and G are polynomial in hn, and dt is the distribution restricted to a
single type t (i.e., dt(i) = d(t, i)/
∑
i d(t, i)). The (generalized) grouping property
[Cover and Thomas 1991] of entropy allows us to express H(d) in terms of the entropy
of the distributions for each fixed t, or the H(dt). Because ft =
∑
i d(t, i), this has the
particularly simple form H(d) = H(~f) +
∑
t ftH(dt). Thus, up to a polynomial factor,
the number of such states is∏
t
ehnftH(dt) = ehn(
∑
t ftH(dt)) = ehn(H(d)−H(
~f).
By Lemma A.3, each of theses states has the same probability π(~x). Thus, dropping
the superscript ~x on d~x for brevity, the probability of being in such a state is:
ehn(H(d)−H(
~f))π(~x) = ehn(H(d)−H(
~f))
∏
i
(βiχt/ρi)
xi/Z
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f))Z−hn
∏
i
(ωti)
xi
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f))Z−hn
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
(ωt)
hnid(t,i)
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f))Z−hn
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
ehnid(t,i) logωt
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f)−logZ+
∑
t
∑kt
i=0 id(t,i) logωt)
= ehnV (d)
Theorem 4.1 says that there exists a q ∈ ∆~f,m,~k (i.e., a probability distribution on
agent types t and amounts of money i) with certain properties. We now define the
appropriate q. Let
q(t, i) = (ωt)
i /

∑
t
kt∑
j=0
(ωt)
j

 . (5)
It is not immediately clear why this is the right choice of q. As the following
lemma shows, this definition allows us to characterize the distribution that maxi-
mizes the probability of being in a state corresponding to that distribution (as given by
Lemma A.4) in terms of relative entropy.
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LEMMA A.5. The uniquemaximumof V (d) = H(d)−H(~f )−logZ+
∑
t
∑kt
i=0 id
t
i logωt
on ∆~f,m,~k occurs at d
∗
q .
PROOF. For brevity, we drop the superscript ~x on d and let Y =
∑
t
∑
j(ωt)
j .
argmaxdV (d) = argmaxd(H(d)−H(~f)− logZ +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
id(t, i) logωt)
= argmaxd(H(d) +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
id(t, i) logωt)
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + id(t, i) logωt]
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log(q(t, i)Y )]
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log q(t, i) + d(t, i) log Y ]
= argmaxd log Y +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log q(t, i)]
= argmind
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[d(t, i) log d(t, i)− d(t, i) log q(t, i)]
= argmind
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
d(t, i) log
d(t, i)
q(t, i)
= argmindH(d||q).
By definition, d∗q minimizes H(d||q). It is unique because H (and thus V ) is a strictly
concave function on a closed convex set.
Lemma A.5 tells us that the most likely distributions of money to be observed are
those with low relative entropy to q. Among all distributions in∆~f,m,k, relative entropy
is minimized by d∗q . However, given n, it is quite possible that d
∗
q is not d
~x for any ~x.
For example, if d∗q(t, i) = 1/3 for some t and i, but fthn = 16, then d
~x(t, i) = d∗q(t, i) only
if exactly 16/3 agents of type t to have i dollars, which cannot be the case. However,
as the following lemma shows, for sufficiently large n, we can always find a d~x that is
arbitrarily close to d∗q . For convenience, we use the 1-norm as our notion of distance.
LEMMA A.6. For all ǫ, there exists nǫ such that, if n > nǫ, then for some state ~x,
||d~x − d∗q || < ǫ.
PROOF. Given n, we construct d ∈ ∆~f,m,k that is of the form d
~x and is close to d∗q in
a number of steps. As a first step, for all t and i, let d1(t, i) be the result of rounding
d∗q(t, i) to the nearest 1/hn (where ties are broken arbitrarily). The function d1 may not
be in ∆~f,m,k; we make minor adjustments to it to get a function in ∆~f,m,k. First, note
that we may have
∑
i d1(t, i) 6= ft. Since ft is a multiple of 1/hn, can get a function d2
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that satisfies these constraints by modifying each term d1(t, i) by either adding 1/hn
to it, subtracting 1/hn from it, or leaving it alone. Such a function d2 may still violate
the final constraint that
∑
t,i id2(t, i) = m. We construct a function d3 that satisfies this
constraint (while continuing to satisfy the constraint that
∑
i d3(t, i) = ft) as follows.
Note that if we increase d2(t, i) by 1/hn and decrease d2(t, j) by 1/hn, then we keep the
keep
∑
i d2(t, i) = ft, and change
∑
i id2(t, i) by (i − j)/hn. Since each term d2(t, i) is a
multiple of 1/hn and m is a multiple of 1/h, we can perform these adjustments until
all the constraints are satisfied.
The rounding to create d1 changed each d1(t, i) by at most 1/hn, so ||d∗q − d1||1 ≤
(
∑
t kt + 1)/hn. Since, each term d1(t, i) was changed by at most 1/hn to obtain d2(t, i),
we have ||d1 − d2||1 ≤ (
∑
t kt + 1)/hn. Let c = maxt(max(kt −m,m)). Each movement
of up to 1/hn in the creation of d1 and d2 altered m by at most c/hn. Thus at most 2c
movements are needed in the creation of d3 for each pair (t, i). Therefore, ||d2 − d3||1 ≤
(
∑
t kt+1)2c/hn. By the triangle inequality, ||d
∗
q−d3|| ≤ (
∑
t kt+1)(2c+2)/hn, which is
O(1/n). Hence, for nǫ sufficiently large, the resulting d3 will always be within distance
ǫ of d∗q .
Finally, we need to show that d3 = d~x for some ~x. Each d3(t, i) is a multiple of 1/hn.
There are hn agents in total, so we can find such an ~x by taking any allocation of money
such that d3(t, i)hn agents of type t have i dollars.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1. We repeat the statement here for the
reader’s convenience.
THEOREM 4.1. For all games (T, ~f, h,m, 1), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all ε > 0,
there exist q ∈ ∆~f,m,~k and nε such that, for all n > nε, there exists a round r
∗ such that,
for all r > r∗, we have Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1− ε.
PROOF. From Lemma A.3, we know that, after a sufficient amount of time, the
probability of being in state ~x will be close to π~x = w~x/Z. SinceM converges to a limit
distribution, it is sufficient to show that the theorem holds in the limit as r → ∞. If
the theorem holds in the limit for some ε′ < ε, then we can take r large enough that the
L1 distance between the distribution of the chain at time r and the limit distribution
(i.e. treating the distributions as vectors and computing the sum of the absolute values
of their differences) is at most ε− ε′.
The remainder of the proof is essentially that of Theorem 3.13 in [Grove et al. 1994]
(applied in a very different setting). Let V (d) = H(d) − H(~f) − logZ +∑
t
∑kt
i=0 id(t, i) logωt. We show there exists a value vL such that, for all states ~x such
that d~x is not within ε of d∗q , we have V (d
~x) ≤ vL, and a value vH > vL such that
vH = V (d
~y) for some point ~y such that d~y is within distance ε of d∗q . Lemma A.4 then
shows that it is exponentially more likely that d~x
r
= d~y than any distribution d such
that V (d) ≤ vL. If ~xr = ~y then Irq,n,ε = 1, and if I
r
q,n,ε = 0 then V (d
~xr ) ≤ vL, so this
suffices to establish the theorem.
By Lemma A.5, the unique maximum of V on ∆~f,m,~k occurs at d
∗
q . The set {d ∈
∆~f,m,~k | ||d
∗
q −d||2 ≥ ε} is closed. V is a continuous function, so it takes some maximum
vL on this set. Pick some vH such that vL < vH < V (d∗q). By the continuity of V , there
exists an ǫ such that if ||d∗q − d||1 < ǫ then V (d) ≥ vH . By Lemma A.6, for sufficiently
large n, there is always some ~x such that ||d∗q − d
~x||1 < ǫ. Thus, for some ~x ∈ Xε,q,
V (d~x) ≥ vH .
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Pr(Irqn,,ǫ = 1) ≥ Pr(~x
r ∈ {~y | d~y = d~x}). By Lemma A.4, Pr(Irq,n,ǫ = 1) is at
least 1/F (hn)ehnV (d
~x) ≥ 1/F (hn)ehnvH . Now consider a ~y such that Iq,n,ǫ(~y) = 0. By
Lemma A.4, the probability that d~x
r
= d~y is at most G(hn)ehnV (d
~y) ≤ G(hn)ehnvL .
There are at most (hn + 1)
∑
t(kt+1) such points, a number which is polynomial in hn.
Thus, for G′(hn) = G(hn)(hn + 1)
∑
t(kt+1), the probability that Irq,n,ǫ = 0 is at most
G′(hn)ehnvL . The ratio of these probabilities is at most
G′(hn)ehnvL
1
F (hn)e
hnvH
=
G′(hn)F (hn)
ehn(vH−vL)
.
This is the ratio of a polynomial to an exponential, so the probability of seeing a distri-
bution of distance greater than ε from d∗q goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
B. PROOFS FROM SECTION ??
In this appendix, we provide the omitted proofs from Section 5.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 relies on modeling the game from the perspective of a
single agent. Consider a vector ~k of thresholds and the corresponding strategy profile
~S(~k). Fix an agent i of type t. Assume that all the agents other than i continue play
their part of ~S(~k). What is i’s best response? Since the set of agents is large, i’s choice of
strategy will have (essentially) no impact on the distribution of money. By Theorem 4.1,
the distribution of money will almost always be close to a distribution d∗. Suppose,
the distribution were exactly d∗. Since we know the exact distribution of money and
the thresholds used by the other agents, we can calculate the number of each type of
agent that wish to volunteer and thus the probabilities that our single agent will be
able to earn or spend a dollar. Thus, by assuming the distribution of money is always
exactly d∗, we can model the game from the perspective of agent i as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP). We show in Lemma B.2 that this MDP has an optimal threshold policy.
(Threshold policies are known as monotone policies in the more general setting where
there are more than two actions.) We then prove that any optimal policy for the MDP
is an ǫ-best reply to the strategies of the other agents in the actual game.
Taking notation from Puterman [1994], we formally define the MDP P
G,~S(~k),t =
(S,A, p(· | s, a), r(s, a)) that describes the game where all the agents other than i are
playing ~S(~k)−i and i has type t.
— S = {0, . . . ,mhn} is the set of possible states for the MDP (i.e., the possible amounts
of money compatible with the distribution d∗).
—A = {0, 1} is the set of possible actions for the agent, where 0 denotes not volunteering
and 1 denotes volunteering iff another agent who has at least one dollar makes a
request.
— pu is the probability of earning a dollar, assuming the agent volunteers (given that
all other agents have fixed their thresholds according to ~k and the distribution of
money is exactly d∗). Each agent of type t′ who wishes to volunteer can do so with
probability βt′ . Assuming exactly the expected number of agents are able to volunteer,
υt′ = βt′(ft′ − d∗(t′, kt′))n agents of type t′ volunteer. Note that we are disregarding
the effect of i in computing the υt′ , since this will have a negligible effect for large n.
Using the υts, we can express pu as the product of two probabilities: that some agent
other than i who has a dollar is chosen to make a request and that i is the agent
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chosen to satisfy it. Thus,
pu =
(∑
t′
ρt′(ft′ − d
∗(t′, 0))
)(
χtβt∑
t′ χt′υt′
)
. (6)
— pd is the probability of agent i having a request satisfied, given that agent i has a
dollar. Given that all agents are playing a threshold strategy, if the total number n of
agents is sufficiently large, then it is almost certainly the case that some agent will
always be willing and able to volunteer. Thus, we can take pd to be the probability
that agent i will be chosen to make a request; that is,
pd =
ρt
n
(7)
— r(s, a) is the (immediate) expected reward for performing action a in state s. Thus,
r(s, 0) = γtpd if s > 0; r(0, 0) = 0; r(s, 1) = γtpd − αtpu if s > 0; and r(0, 1) = −αtpu.
— p(s′ | s, a) is the probability of being in state s′ after performing action a in state s;
p(s′ | s, a) is determined by pu and pd; specifically, p(s+1 | s, 1) = pu, p(s−1 | s, a) = pd
if s > 0, and the remainder of the probability is on p(s | s, a) (i.e., p(s | s, a) =
1− (p(s+ 1 | s, 1) + p(s− 1 | s, a)).
— u∗(s) is the expected utility of being in state s if agent i uses the optimal policy for
the MDP P
G,~S(~k),t
— u(s, a) is the expected utility for performing action a in state s, given that the optimal
strategy is followed after this action;
u(s, a) = r(s, a) + δ
mhn∑
s′=0
p(s′ | s, a)u∗(s′).
To prove Theorem 5.2, we need two preliminary lemmas about the MDP P
G,~S(~k),t.
LEMMA B.1. For the MDP P
G,~S(~k),t, u
∗(s+ 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s+ 1).
PROOF. The MDP P
G,~S(~k),t has an optimal stationary policy [Puterman 1994, The-
orem 6.2.10] (a policy where the chosen action depends only on the current state). Let
π be such a policy. Consider the policy π′ starting in state s + 1 that “pretends” it ac-
tually started in state s and is following π. More precisely, if s0 = s + 1 and sj > 0
for j = 0, . . . , k, define π′(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = π(sk − 1); otherwise, if j ≤ k is the least
index such that sj = 0, define π′(s0, . . . , sk) = π(sk). Given a history (s0, . . . , sk), j is
the random variable whose value is the minimum i such that si = 0 or ∞ if no such
value exists. The definition of π′ from π creates a bijection between histories that start
in state s + 1 and histories that start in state s, such that if h′ corresponds to h, the
probability of history h′ with policy π′ is the same as the probability of h with policy π.
Technically, making the mapping a bijection requires the introduction of a new state
0′, which intuitively represents the state where the agent has zero dollars and missed
an opportunity to have a request satisfied last round because of it. More formally, we
let p(0′ | 0, a) = pd and p(s | 0′, a) = p(s | 0, a). With this change, the probabilities of
corresponding histories are the same because the probability of transitioning from a
state to the one “immediately below” it (where s−1 is immediately below s, 0′ is imme-
diately below 0, and 0′ is immediately below itself) is always pd, and the probability of
transitioning from a state to the one “immediately above” it (where s+1 is immediately
above s, and 1 is immediately above 0′) is always pu.8
8Note that this means that 0′ is immediately below 0 but 1 is immediately above 0′. This is intended, because
0′ intuitively represents the state where the agent has 0 dollars and had a request go unsatisfied due to a
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This argument shows that an agent starting with s+ 1 dollars “pretending” to start
with swill have the same expected reward each round as an agent who actually started
with s dollars, except during the first round j in a history such that sj = 0. Thus
(treating j as a random variable), we have
u∗(s+ 1) ≥ u∗(s) + E[δjγt].
Similarly, we can use π starting from state s + 2 to define a policy π′′ starting from
state s + 1, where i “pretends” he has one more dollar and is using π, up to the first
round j′ that he is chosen to make a request with π in a state where he has no money
(in which case he can make the request with π started from s + 2, but cannot make it
with π′′ started from s+ 1); from that point on, he uses π. For corresponding histories,
the utilities of an agent starting with s + 1 dollars and following π′′ and an agent
starting with s + 2 dollars and following π will be the same, except during round j′
the agent following π will have a request satisfied but the agent following π′′ will not.
Thus,
u∗(s+ 1) ≥ u∗(s+ 2)− E[δj
′
γt].
Since, if i uses π, he will run out of money sooner if he starts with s dollars than if
he starts with s+ 2 dollars,
E[δjγt] > E[δ
j′γt].
Thus, u∗(s+ 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s+ 1).
LEMMA B.2. P
G,~S(~k),t has an optimal threshold policy.
PROOF. As shown by Puterman [1994, Lemma 4.7.1], it suffices to prove that u(s, a)
is subadditive. That is, we need to prove that, for all states s,
u(s+ 1, 1) + u(s, 0) ≤ u(s+ 1, 0) + u(s, 1). (8)
We consider here only the case that s > 0 (the argument is essentially the same if
s = 0). Because s > 0, r(s + 1, a) = r(s, a), so (8) is equivalent to
puu
∗(s+ 2) + pdu
∗(s) + (1 − pu − pd)u∗(s+ 1) + pdu∗(s− 1) + (1− pd)u∗(s)
≤ pdu∗(s) + (1− pd)u∗(s+ 1) + puu∗(s+ 1) + pdu∗(s− 1) + (1− pu − pd)u∗(s).
This simplifies to
u∗(s+ 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s+ 1),
which follows from Lemma B.1.
We can now prove Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.2.
LEMMA 5.1. Consider the games Gn = (T, ~f, h,m, n) (where T , ~f , h, andm are fixed,
but nmay vary). There exists a k such that for all n, sk is an optimal policy for PGn,~S(~k),t.
The threshold k is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(κ,pu,pd)]γt, (4)
where J(κ, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value is the first round in which an agent
starting with κ dollars, using strategy sκ, and with probabilities pu and pd of earning a
dollar and of being chosen given that he volunteers, respectively, runs out of money.
lack of money in the previous round, so if he then earns a dollar he will have 1 dollar regardless of whether
or not his request of two rounds previous was satisfied.
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PROOF. Fix n. Suppose that an agent is choosing between a threshold of κ and a
threshold of κ + 1. These policies only differ when the agent has κ dollars: he will
volunteer with the latter but not with the former. If he volunteers when he has κ
dollars and is chosen, he will pay a cost of αt and he will have κ + 1 dollars. As in the
proof of Lemma B.1, we can define a bijection on histories such that, in corresponding
histories of equal probability, an agent who started with κ dollars and is using sκ will
always have one less dollar than an agent who started with κ + 1 dollars and is using
sκ+1, until the first round r in which the agent using sκ+1 has zero dollars. This means
that in round r − 1 the agent using sκ+1 had a request satisfied but the agent using sk
was unable to because he had no money. Thus, if the agent volunteers when he has κ
dollars and pays a cost of αt in the current round, the expected value of being able to
spend that dollar in the future is E[(1− (1− δt)/n)J(κ+1,pu,pd)]γt. Since this expectation
is strictly increasing in κ (an agent with more money takes longer to spend it all), the
maximum κ such that Equation (4) holds is an optimal threshold policy.
Taking the maximum value of κ that satisfies Equation (4) ensures that, for the n
we fixed, we chose the maximum optimal threshold. We now need to show that this
maximum optimal threshold is independent of n, which we do by showing that the
expecting utility of every threshold policy sk is independent of n. The expected utility
of a policy depends on the initial amount of money, but since an agent’s current amount
of money is a random walk whose transition probabilities are determined by pu and pd,
there is a well-defined limit probability
x∗i = lim
r→∞
Pr(agent has i dollars in round r)
determined by the ratio pu/pd (this is because the limit distribution satisfies the de-
tailed balance condition: x∗i pu = x
∗
i+1pd). This distribution has the property that if the
agent starts with i dollars with probability x∗i , then in every round the probability he
has i dollars is x∗i . Thus, in each round his expected utility is γpd(1− x
∗
0)−αpu(1− x
∗
k).
We can factor out n to write pu = p′u/n and pd = p
′
d/n where p
′
u and p
′
d are independent
of n. Note that pu/pd = p′u/p
′
d, so the x
∗
i ’s are independent of n. Thus, we can rewrite
the agent’s expected utility for each round as c/n, where c = γp′d(1− x
∗
0) − αp
′
u(1− x
∗
k)
is independent of n. Therefore, the expected utility of sk is
∞∑
r=0
(
1−
1− δt
n
)r
c
n
=
c
1− δt
,
which is independent of n.
THEOREM 5.2. For all games G = (T, ~f, h,m, n), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all
ε > 0, there exist n∗ε and δ
∗
ε,n such that for all n > n
∗
ε, types t ∈ T , and δt > δ
∗
ε,n, an
optimal threshold policy for P
G,~S(~k),t is an ε-best reply to the strategy profile
~S(~k)−i for
every agent i of type t.
PROOF. By Lemma B.2, P
G,~S(~k),t has an optimal threshold policy. However, this
might not be a best reply for agent i in the actual game if the other agents are playing
~S(~k). P
G,~S(~k),t assumes that the probabilities of earning or spending a dollar in a given
round are always exactly pu and pd respectively. Theorem 4.1 guarantees only that, in
the game, the corresponding probabilities are close to pu and pd with high probability
after some amount of time that can depend on n. A strategy S for player i in G defines
a policy πS for PG,~S(~k),t in the obvious way; similarly, a policy for the MDP determines
a strategy for player i in the game. The expected utility of πS is close to Ui(S, ~S(~k)−i),
but is, in general, not equal to it, because, as we noted, pu and pd may differ from
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the corresponding probabilities in the game. They differ for three reasons: (1) they are
close, but not identical; (2) they are only close with high probability, and (3) they are
only close after some amount of time. As we now show, given ε, the difference in the
expected utility due to each reason can be bounded by ε/6, so the expected utility of
any strategy is within ε/2 of the value the corresponding policy in P
G,~S(~k),t. Thus, an
optimal strategy for the MDP is an ε-best reply.
As we have seen, the probabilities pu and pd are determined by the number of agents
of each type that volunteer (i.e., the expressions υt′ for each type t′). The distance
between d~x
r
and d∗ bounds how much the actual number of agents of type t′ that wish
to volunteer in round r can differ from υt′/βt′ . Even if exactly υt′/βt′ agents wish to
volunteer for each type t′, there might not be exactly υt′ agents who actually volunteer
because of the stochastic decision by nature about who can volunteer and because i
cannot satisfy his own requests. However, for sufficiently large n, the effect on pu and
pd from these two factors is arbitrarily close to zero. Applying Theorem 4.1, there exist
n1 and r1 such that if there are at least n1 agents, for all round r > r1, d
~xr and d∗ are
sufficiently close that the difference between the utility of policy πS′ in the MDP and
Ui((S
′, ~S−i) in rounds r > r1 where d
∗ is sufficiently close is at most ε/6.
Note that the maximum possible difference in utility between a round of the MDP
and a round of the game is γ + α (if agent i spends a dollar rather than earning one).
Applying Theorem 4.1 again, for e = ε/6(γ + α), there exist n2 and r2 such that the
probability of the distribution not being within e of d∗ is less than e. Thus, the differ-
ence between the expected utility of policy πS′ in the MDP and Ui((S′, ~S−i) in rounds
r > r2 where d∗ is not sufficiently close is at most e(γ + α) = ε/6.
Let n∗ε = max(n1, n2) and r
∗ = max(r1, r2). The values of n∗ε and r
∗ do not depend on
δ, so we can take δ∗ε,n to be sufficiently close to 1 that the total utility from the first r
∗
rounds is at most ε/6, completing the proof of the theorem.
Recall that BRG maps a vector ~k describing the threshold strategy for each type to a
vector ~k′ of best replies.
LEMMA 5.3. Consider the family of games Gm = (T, ~f, h,m, n) and the strategies
~S(~k), for mhn <
∑
t ftkthn. For this family of game, λm,~k is non-decreasing in m and
non-increasing in ~k; pm,
~k
u is non-decreasing inm and non-increasing in
~k; and the func-
tion BRG is non-decreasing in ~k and non-increasing in m.
PROOF. We first show that that λ
m,~k
is monotone in m and ~k. We then show that
pm,
~k
u is a monotone function of λm,~k and that BRG is a monotone function of p
m,~k
u ,
completing the proof.
We now show that λ
m,~k
is non-decreasing in m. Fix a vector of thresholds ~k and let
g~k(λ) =
∑
t,i
i
ftλ
iq~k(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
jq~k(t, j)
, (9)
where q~k is the value of q from Equation (5) (we add the subscript
~k to stress the
dependence on ~k). The definition of λ
m,~k
in Equations (2) and (3) in Lemma 4.2 ensures
that, for all m, m = g~k(λm,~k). A relatively straightforward computation shows that
g′~k(λ) > 0 for all λ. Thus, if m
′ > m, g~k(λ) = m, and g~k(λ
′) = m′, we must have λ′ > λ.
It follows that λ
m,~k
is increasing in m. (Note that λ
m,~k
is undefined for m ≥
∑
t ftkt,
which is why monotonicity holds only for values of m such that mhn <
∑
t ftkt.)
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We next show that λ
m,~k
is non-increasing in ~k. Since we have a finite set of types,
it suffices to consider the case where a single type t∗ increases its threshold by 1. Let
~k denote the initial vector of thresholds, and let ~k′ denote the vector of thresholds
after agents of type t∗ increase their threshold by 1; that is, kt = k′t for t 6= t
∗, and
k′t∗ = kt∗ + 1.
The first step in showing that λ
m,~k
is non-increasing in ~k is to show that g~k′(λm,~k) >
g~k(λm,~k) = m. We do this by breaking the sum in the definition of g in Equation (9) into
two pieces; those terms where t 6= t∗, and those where t = t∗.
It follows immediately from Equation (5) that there exists a constant c such that, for
all i and t 6= t∗, we have q~k′ (t, i) = cq~k(t, i). It follows from Equation (2) that for all i
and t 6= t∗, since kt = k′t, we have
i
ftλ
i
m,~k
q~k′(t, i)∑k′t
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t, j)
= i
ftλ
i
m,~k
cq~k(t, i)∑k′t
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
cq~k(t, j)
= i
ftλ
i
m,~k
q~k(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t, j)
; (10)
that is, the corresponding terms in the sum for g~k′(λm,~k) and g~k(λm,~k) are the same if
t 6= t∗.
Now consider the corresponding terms for type t∗. First observe that for all i < k′t,
ft∗λ
i
m,~k
q~k′(t
∗, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t
∗, j)
<
ft∗λ
i
m,~k
q~k(t
∗, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t
∗, j)
; (11)
the two terms have essentially the same numerator (the use of q~k′ instead of q~k cancels
out as in Equation (10)), but the first has a larger denominator because k′t∗ = kt∗ + 1,
so there is one more term in the sum. Since ft∗ =
∑kt∗
i=0 d
∗
q~k
(t∗, i) =
∑k′t∗
i=0 d
∗
q~k′
(t∗, i), by
Equations (2) and (3),
kt∗∑
i=0
ft∗λ
i
m,~k
q~k(t
∗, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t
∗, j)
=
k′t∗∑
i=0
ft∗λ
i
m,~k
q~k′ (t
∗, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t
∗, j)
. (12)
It follows that
k′t∗∑
i=0
i
ft∗λ
i
m,~k
q~k′(t, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t, j)
>
kt∗∑
i=0
i
ftλ
i
m,~k
q~k(t, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t, j)
. (13)
To see this, note that the two expressions above have the form
∑kt∗+1
i=0 ici and
∑kt∗
i=0 idi,
respectively. By Equation (12),
∑kt∗+1
i=0 ci =
∑kt∗
i=0 di = ft∗ ; by Equation (11), ci < di
for i = 0, . . . , kt∗ . Thus, in going from the right side to the left side, weight is being
transferred from lower terms to kt∗ + 1.
Combining Equations (10) and (13) gives us g~k′(λm,~k) > g~k(λm,~k) = m, as desired.
Since g~k′(λm,~k′) = m, by definition, it follows that g~k′(λm,~k) > g~k′(λm,~k′). Since, as
shown above, g ~k′′ is an increasing function, it follows that λm,~k > λm,~k′ . Thus, λm,~k is
decreasing in ~k.
We now show that the monotonicity of λ
m,~k
implies the monotonicity of pm,
~k
u . To do
this, we show that, for all types t, pm,
~k
u = pdλm,~kωt. Since ωt and pd are independent of
m and ~k, it then follows that the monotonicity of λ
m,~k
implies the monotonicity of pm,
~k
u .
(Recall that ωt = βtχt/ρt was defined in Section 3.)
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Fix a type t′. Then, dropping superscripts and subscripts on pu, d, and λ for brevity,
we have the following sequence of equalities (where the explanation for some of these
lines is given following the equations):
pu =
(∑
t
ρT (ft − d(t, 0)
)(
χt′βt′
n
∑
t χtβt(ft − d(t, kt))
)
(14)
=
( ∑
t
∑kt
i=1 ρtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)
)(
χt′βt′
n
)
(15)
=
(∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 ρtλωtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)
)(
χt′βt′
n
)
(16)
= λ
(∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)
)
(ωt′pd) (17)
= λωt′pd
Equation (14) is just the definition of pu from Equation (6). Equation (15) follows from
the observation that, by Equation (2), ft =
∑
i d(t, i). Equation (16) follows from the
observation that, again by Equation (2), d(t, i) = ωtλd(t, i − 1). Equation (17) follows
from the definitions of ωt and pd (see Equation (7)). Thus, as required, pm,
~k
u = pdλm,~kωt.
Finally, we show that the monotonicity of pm,
~k
u implies the monotonicity of BRG. Let
~k′′ = BRG(~k). By Lemma 5.1, k′′t is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1 − δt)/n)
J(κ,pm,
~k
u ,pd)]γt.
We (implicitly) defined the random variable J(κ, pu, pd) as a function on histories. In-
stead, we can define J(κ, pu, pd) as a function on random bitstrings (which intuitively
determine a history). With this redefinition, it is clear that, if pu < p′u, for all bitstrings
b, we have J(κ, pu, pd)(b) < J(κ, p′u, pd)(b). It easily follows that
E[(1− (1 − δt)
J(κ,p′u,pd)] < E[(1− (1 − δt)
J(κ,pu,pd)]
for all κ. Thus, the monotonicity of BRG follows from the monotonicity of pm,
~k
u .
LEMMA 5.4. For all games G = (T, ~f, h,m, n), there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that if
δt > δ
∗ for all t, there is a vector ~k of thresholds such that BRG(~k) > ~k.
PROOF. Take ~k to be such that kt = ⌈m⌉ + 1 for each type t. Then by Theorem 5.2,
there exists a ~k′ such that BRG(~k) = ~k
′. By Lemma 5.1, k′t is the maximum value of κ
such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(κ,p
~k
u,pd)]γt. (4)
As δt approaches 1, E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(κ,p
~k
u,pd)] approaches 1, and so the right hand side
of Equation (4) approaches γt. For any standard agent, αt < γt. Thus, there exists a δt
such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(kt,p
~k
u,pd)]γt.
For this choice of δt, we must have k′t ≥ kt + 1 > kt. Take δ
∗ = maxt δt.
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